O n1 4M arch 2016, Russian PresidentV ladimir Putin suddenly declaredt hath is countryw as withdrawing' most' of its forces from Syria, following thousands of air strikes in support of the Syrian regime and its Iranian,Hizbullah, Iraqi, Pakistani and Afghana llies.T he announcement broughtyet another phase in Syria'sfiveyear conflict to an end; however, as with the previous phases,ithas not heralded anyadvance towardsaresolutionofthe crisis.
Instead, the Russian intervention contributed to ac onsolidation of space in which leading Syria-based actors-the regime of PresidentBashar Al-Assad, the opposition rebel bloc: and the Kurdish movement( dominateda tt his pointb y the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party,P YD, and its militia, known as the People'sP rotection Units, YPG) -exercised and entrenched their authority locally.T his occurred alongside efforts which were nominally concentrated on diminishingt he powero ft he other twoa ctors, Daesh (also known as the Islamic Stateo fI raqa nd Syria,I SIS) and the Al-Qa'ida-affiliatedJ abhatA l-Nusra. This consolidation has been helped along by the support thatthe opposition rebel bloc receives (primarily from Saudi Arabia and otherGulf States),apartial ceasefire thathas been in place since 27 February 2016 and severalrounds of negotiations in Geneva.
At the time of writing,the ceasefire betweenr ebels, theS yrianm ilitarya nd the Assad regime'sexternalallied forces (Russia, Hizbullah, Iran,a nd Iraqi and Afghanm ilitias)i sb reaking down in northwest Syria,n otably nearA leppo and in the coastalL atakia province.A t the same time, Kurdish YPGfighters are attemptingt ot aket erritory from the rebels,while fighting has also continued betweenD aesh and rebels in northern Syria neart he Turkishb order.N one of these contests arel ikely to conclude with ad ecisive militaryv ictoryf or any side. The situation in Syria is thus one characterised by ap olitical and military stalemate and de factopartition. As the prospects of moving beyond this status quo in the nearf uturea re limited,a further consolidation of the various frontlinesbetween regime, Kurdish and opposition forces is more likely to offer a stabilisation of the situation across much of Syria.
This analysis doesn ot, in line with mosto ft he literatureo nc ivil war settlement, 1 advocatet he partition of Syria as al ong-terms olution to the country'so ngoing conflict.H owever, equally onec annotr ule out thats uch partition -d ef actoo rd ej ure-w ill be the eventual outcome of ac ivil war nowi ni ts sixth year. Therefore, the question this article addresses is not whatac omprehensivea nd sustainable settlementofthe conflict maylook likein the future,but rather howtoconnect the legitimacyrecentlyconferred on various Syrian actorsbythe Geneva negotiations and other international discussions to existing and future local arrangements establishing stability and security on the ground. These, in turn, aren ecessary conditions foracredible and sustainable transition from the current civilw ar. Arrangementsp ut in place nowf or governance, reconstruction, provision of services, justiceand civic engagement sYRIa: laYIng ThE FOunDaTIOns FOR a cREDIBlE anD susTaInaBlE TRansITIOn scOTTl ucas, chRIsTalla YakInThOu anD sTEFan WOlFF Despite its extreme fragility, the ceasefire in place in Syria since February 2016 has afforded the opportunity to assess the options for a set of interim governance and transitional justice arrangements. These could establish the foundations for a transition following the conclusion of the Syrian civil war, regardless of its endpoint. Drawing on the specifics of the Syrian case and wider studies of interventions in, and transitions from, civil war, Scott Lucas, Christalla Yakinthou and Stefan Wolff consider the challenges of peace-and state-building, identifying both risks and mitigating actions. The article argues that risk mitigation is possible and should begin now. These efforts need to be supported by the international community in order to lay the foundations for a credible and sustainable post-civil war transition in Syria.
will laythe foundation for, and shape the directionof, the political, legal, economic and social constructions thatw ill be necessary if there is ever againt ob ea meaningful 'Syria' in the sense of asingle state, or even if severale ntities emerge in the aftermath of thec ivil war. These arrangementsmustbemade now, rather than waiting forat erminalm oment in the conflict.T heym ustb eb ased on recognition of the necessityofa'bottomup' approach, establishing connections with localg roupsr ather than imposing ap reconceived international model of thep roper,' moderate' proceduresa nd actors. 2 It is against this backgroundt hat this article assessest he options of an interim systemw hich -f ollowing the declaration of ac essation of hostilities -c ould establish the foundations for as ubsequentt ransition, regardlesso f its endpoint. Thus, this analysis begins from the ground up, rather than from at op-down projection of 'Syria' from the outside.D rawingo nt he specificso f the Syrianc ase and the wider studies of interventions in, and transitions from, civil war, 3 the article considers the challenges of peace-and state-building, and of transitional justice, identifying both risks and mitigating actions. 4 The keyp oint hereisthatrisk mitigation needs to begin now-and it needs to start with asober analysis of the realities on the ground, rather than with the types of wishful, evasivea nd hyperbolic thinking that has characteriseds om uch of Western intervention formorethan adecade.
This article sits alongside efforts such as thoseo fJ ames Dobbins, Philip Gordon and JeffreyM artini. The aforementioned analysts focus on the creationo fs afez ones, the partition of territoryw ith international guarantors of the respectiver egime, opposition andK urdish areas, prisoner releases, humanitarian deliveries and ac o-operatived estruction of Daesh.I n contrast,t his examination focuses on the governance andt ransitional justice arrangements needed foracredible and sustainable post-civilw ar transition in Syria that cana nd should be supported by the internationalcommunity now.
The next section offers aconceptual framework forthe argument, drawing on existing literatureonconflict settlement and post-civilw ar transitions. It makes use of awide rangeofopen-source data and it then offers ab riefc hronological narrativeofthe developing crisis in Syria. This forms thee mpirical basis fort he subsequentanalysis of the requirements forac redible and sustainable postcivilw ar transition in Syria andh ow steps takenn ow by the international community canc ontributet ol aying these foundations. The article concludes with some brief policy recommendations embedded in an assessmento ft he benefits and shortcomings of the proposal.
is dependento nan umbero ff actors, manyo fw hich areb eyond the control of externalactorswhose engagementis neverthelesso ften critical to success. 7 Among those factorst hata re,a tl east partially,u nder the controlo fd omestic and externala ctorsi st he design of post-civilw ar institutions: thati s, the negotiated( or at times imposed) rules of the politicalg ame aftert he civil war concerning the forms of representation and participation (or exclusion) of differenta ctors, and the distributiono f powerand resources amongthem. 8 From this perspective, transitions from civilwar are often exercises in both peace-building and state-building, 9 which requirea thorough analysis of the underlying conflict (including the causesofits onset and persistence). 10 Mosto ft he literatureo nc onflict settlementand post-civilwar transitions is focused on building democratic states. This is primarily based on the assumption thatd emocracy in itselfi saform of conflict settlementand helpstoprevent conflict recurrence, 11 despites ignificant theoretical arguments and growing empirical evidence to the contrary. 12 Severalr ecents tudies emphasise the importance of local conditions to the success of democratic state-building afterc ivil war, as caution against overconfident external democracy-builders thatl ack strong and committedl ocal partners whomt heyc an support. 13 TimothyDS isk,i nh is accounto ft he dilemmas of power-sharinginthe Syrian civil warand moregenerally,has argued persuasively for'the need forscholarsto develop morec ontingent-and contextspecific knowledge' if academic research is to makeam eaningfulc ontribution to policy. 14 Thus, there is firsto fa ll an eed for an approach thatstarts with athorough assessmentofthe situation in Syria as it is, rather than whatobservers mightwish it to be. The following section offers such an assessment, albeit with the caveat thatthe situation in Syria andthe region morebroadly remainshighly fluid.
Second, while 'models' of post-civil wart ransitions, both in terms of the transition processa nd its substantive outcomes, arec ertainlyl imited in their transferability from one situation to another,t herea re nonethelesss ome useful parallels thatc an be drawnf rom similar transitions in the past. Moreover, based on an analysis of conditions on the ground in Syria,s uch models canb ea daptedi no rder to establish some contingentp redictions on likely trajectoriesofapost-civilw ar transition in the country. Predominantly,t his is about lessons learnedovertime.
Third, the authors' ownp ast research has generally confirmed the significanceo fd omestic factors, and in particular the role of local leadership, in the successo fw ar-to-peace transitions. These domestic factorsc an be shaped and success canultimately be facilitated through ac ombination of institutional designa nd international diplomacy that enables locall eaderst ob uild on and leverage as hared commitmentt o peace. 15 Taking the second and thirdp oints together,the current situation of relative stalemate and de factop artition canb e used productively to shape the domestic conditions thatw ill eventuallyc reate the foundations on which ap ost-civil wart ransition in Syria will be built. This articlefocuses on twoareas of particular importance: futuregovernance structures and transitional justice mechanisms for dealing with the conflict's legacy. These aren ot opportunistically chosen issues; instead, theyr eflecta ne stablished consensus on the importance of institutional designa nd the role that externala ctorsp layi ni ts negotiation, 16 as well as on the needtoreckon with the legacy of conflict-relatedviolence in order to (re-)establish trustinthose institutions. This, in turn, shapes an umber of policyrelevant conclusions -n ot in terms of thed esign of anyp articular outcome of ap ost-civilw ar transition in Syria,b ut of the steps thatc an and should be taken nowb yt he international community to makeacredible and sustainable transition possible.
Syria's De Facto Partition: Local Dynamics and External Agendas
From itsv eryb eginningi n2 011, the dynamics of Syria's civilw ar have been shapeds imultaneously by local factors, and the agendas of externalr egional players( Turkey,I raq, Iran and the Gulf States) as well as otherg lobal actors (the US and Russia). Overall, political conditions were characterised by failed attempts to broker political solutions externallyu nder UN mediation and a highly fragmentedand localised spectrum of armed opposition movements unable to form or sustain ac ommon platform. Militarily, the overalltrajectory has been one of regime contraction,t he initial expansion of Daesh after summer 2014 andi ncreasing territorial controlo fa wider angeo fa nti-Assad forces, albeit accompanied by significanti n-fighting among various groups in the opposition spectrum.
Until the summerof2014, external military interventionw as relatively limited and consistedo fW estern and GulfC ooperation Council support of the opposition in the form of training ande quipment.S imilarR ussian and Iranian supportwas given to the regime, complementedb yal argern umbero f militarya dvisers,a sw ell as fighters providedb yH izbullah, Iraqi and Afghan militias, and the IranianR evolutionary Guardwhich supportedthe Syrianarmy.
This changed in late 2014. The US-led coalition began operations against Daeshf ollowing its expansion in Iraq and northernS yria,w hich includeda n offensivew hich threatened the Kurdish centre of Kobane on the Turkishborder. Even more significantwas the backing of rebel factions by Gulf States. Reorganised in blocs sucha sJ aish Al-Fatah and the Southern Front, the groupsa dvanced againstt he Syrianm ilitaryi nb oth the northwesta nd the south. As Assad's position became morea nd more precarious over thecourse of 2015,due to rebel victories and simultaneous Daesh offensives in thenortheastand the centre of Syria,R ussia decided to intervene with at wo-pronged strategy of military interventionand diplomatic initiatives. 17 On the diplomatic front, Moscow led effortsf or internationald iscussions on a' political transition',b ut without a specific requirementf or the departure of Assad. This initial diplomatic effort wasf rustrated by Saudi Arabia, which embarrassed Russia by bluntly declaring at aM oscow pressc onference in mid-2015t hatA ssad'sr emovalw as a prerequisite forn egotiations. However,
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Russia'ssimultaneous build-up of military assets, particularly warplanes, at ab ase in western Syria andthe beginning of air strikes on 30 September fundamentally altered the political dynamics.T he US, Europeans tatesa nd even Turkey -a leading backero ft he Syriano pposition -a cceptedt hatA ssad could remain in powerf or at least six months while talksd eveloped.S ome US analystsa nd politicians went even further,saying that Washingtonnow had to co-operatewith the regime, even if it wasresponsiblefor the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians. 18 Meanwhile, theR ussian military effort began to have an impact on the battlefield, consolidating and enhancing these political and diplomatic gains. Advanced battlefield equipment, hundreds of 'advisers'i ncluding special forces andspottersfor aerial operations, and thousands of sorties -m oret han 80 per cent of which extended into opposition areas-s upported ground offensives on six fronts by the Syrian military,I ranianc ommanders and troops, Hizbullah units and other foreign militias, particularly from Iraq and Afghanistan. The offensives initially struggled;however,bythe end of 2015, theyhad stabilised Assad'sdefencelines from western Syria to Damascus. The attacksalso begantoerode rebel control in parts of northernand southern Syria, retakinga lmosta ll of Latakia province and achieving further, if limited,g ains near Aleppo and south of Damascus. 19 The Russian interventiont hus succeededinits immediate aim of saving the Assad regime from militarycollapse. Yet, by consolidating Assad'sposition on the ground -and thus, in effect, creating amilitarystalemate -and by contributing to the resumption of the political process in Geneva,Russia'sintervention has led to the entrenchmentofade factoterritorial partition of Syria. This in turn has created, and partly legitimised, the forces in controlo ft hose areasa nd has opened up political spacef or otherg roups, including the regime'so pponents. 20 As these still-fragmentedg roupss eek to find ways to govern thet erritories they occupyand to engageinbroader political discussions with the regime through the UN-mediated Genevaprocess, 21 external actorshaveanopportunity to contribute to laying the foundations of an eventual post-civil wartransition by strengthening and supporting some of the local initiatives thathaveemerged.
Given the domestica nd international consensus thattherewill be no place forDaesh and JabhatAl-Nusra in post-civilwar Syria,the focus of Western actorsa nd their regional allies needst o be on their non-regime partnersinSyria: theK urdish movementa nd the broader opposition rebel bloc. Therefore, the remainder of thiss ectionf ocuseso n tracing the events and processes through which, over thep aste ighteen months, both of these actorshavecome to occupy their currentposition.
Syria's Kurdish movement, specifically the PYDa nd the YPG,h as both benefited from, and caused, regionalschisms.The Kurdish movement begantoreceiveUSassistance,including aerial intervention, in 2014,i no rder to preventDaesh'stakeoverofKobane,the centreofaKurdish canton on the Turkish border.However,Moscow's entryinto the conflict,a sw ell as thef ailure of ah ighprofile $500 million 'train-and-equip' programme forrebels, prompted theUS to incorporatet his supportf or Kurdish factionsinto anew strategy.Rather than continuing the ill-fatedt rain-and-equip programme and otherf ormso fm ilitary supportf or various rebel factions, Washingtone ncouraged the formation of theS yrianD emocraticF orces( SDF), led by the YPG with atoken inclusion of Arab and Assyrian units, to fightDaesheven though Turkey believesthe Turkish insurgentKurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK) is directing the PYDand its militia. 22 As Washingtons upplied arms, ammunition,special forces and air cover, the SDF advanced against Daeshi n eastern and northern Syria. In December, the forces captured the TishreenD am and, despiteaT urkish 'red line',crossed to the western bank of theE uphrates River. This causedc onsiderable anxiety within the Turkishg overnmenta nd arguably triggeredt he subsequent escalation of hostilitiesw ith the PKKi n Turkey's southeast. Discussions between Washingtona nd Ankaram aintaineda n uneasy balancebetween US support for the SDF,including the formal deployment of morespecial forces in April2016, and Turkey's promotion of a' safe zone' in northernSyria alongthe border.
Thatbalance wasfurther threatened by the YPG'slaunch of anew front, with attackso nr ebelsi nn orthwestS yria,i n January. The Kurdish forces, supported in some cases by Russian air strikes, seizedt owns and villages neart he Turkishb order as well as the Menagh Air Base.A lthough Turkey intervened with shellinginorder to check the YPG's assault on the importantborder town of Azaz, the offensive raisedt he prospect of the Afrin canton in northwestS yria being linked with theKobane and Cezire cantons in the northeast,t hus creating acontiguous area under Kurdish control alongthe Turkish border which would be connected to the neighbouring Kurdistan regionofIraq. The cessation of hostilities on 27 February has limited this battle, but the conflict continues in sections of Aleppo city,a long keys upplyr outes and in Kurdish-occupiedt owns nearthe Turkishborder.
Alongsideastrengthened military position, the PYDs ought, with Russian backing,t oe nter thep olitical negotiations. The effort appeared to have paid off with ap ossible invitation from UN envoyStaffandeMisturatojoin talksi nG eneva at the end of January 2016; however, it wasbluntedbyTurkish objections and threats to boycott the process, and de Misturas ubsequently deniedt hata ny approach had been made. Russia'sinclusion of PYDco-leader, Salih Muslim,o na na lternative, fifteennamel istt ot he opposition rebel bloc also had little effect -o ther Kurdish groupsobjectedtothe PYD'sclaim to be representativeofSyrianKurdistan. 23 Viewedt hroughW ashington's prism of aD aesh-first strategy,s upport of the SDF has beenapartial, shortterm response to the accusation that the US and its allies cannot pursue an effectivei ntervention in the Syrian conflict.H owever,t he PYDa nd YPG are not recognised as the unquestioned leadersofthe Kurdish movement, as the dispute over representation at Geneva showed. Furthermore, the short-term accommodation between Turkey and the US is unlikely to continue, especially if the PYDexpands its political controland the YPG continues offensives in northwest Syria. 24 Most importantly,t he strategy does notaddressthe central, continuing dimension of the civil war, which is the deadlyfi ghtf or authority betweent he Assad regime, the Syrianopposition and the rebels.W hile the opposition rebel bloc has beenplaguedbyahighdegree of fragmentation and localisation since the beginning of the wari n2 011, it is still the centralactor on anational scale in the political and militaryc ontest for legitimacy.
Until late 2015, the movement continued to struggle forc oherence and au nified political leadership, but the Russianinitiativefor political talksin the autumn of 2015, and its acceptance by the US, forced the differentf actions to reconsidert heir positions. This was encouragedb yS audi Arabia, whose support had become even more important as Washingtonb egan looking to Kurdish groupsasanincreasingly vital, and morer eliable, ally inside Syria.B y mid-December 2015, opposition political movements and rebel forces agreed to a3 3-member High Negotiations Committee, with former PrimeM inister RiyadHijab as co-ordinator. JaishAl-Islam, the main rebel faction near Damascus, joined the committee. Ahrar Al-Sham, the largest rebel group, initially signedt he document, although it stepped back amid internaldebatesamongits leadershipand took on the role of interestedobserverof the Geneva talks. 25 This high-levelr ealignmenth as intersected with thed evelopment of local opposition rebel institutions thats tarted earlier in 2015 amidt he takeover of territoryi na reas such as Idlibp rovince. Localc ommitteesh ave takeno nt he challenges of security, governance, systems of justice, repair of infrastructurea nd provision of services. Factions, including Ahrar Al-Sham, have begun to distance themselves from the problematicJ abhatA l-Nusra, even as they co-operatew ith the jihadistg roup in some battles.
The developingK urdish and opposition rebel movements cannot create the conditions foral ong-term settlement. In part, this is because of thec onflicting demands of the twos ides, but it is also because of the immovable obstacle of the Assad regime'sc onditions forn egotiating an agreement. Damascush as ruled out Kurdish autonomyi na' federal' Syria, even though theregime'sally,Russia, put forth the idea in February2016. President Assad,ineffect, pre-emptedthe Geneva negotiations in late March when he said thathewould neveracceptatransitional governing authority,the centralelement of internationalp roposals in the period since June 2012.H is positionw as reinforced at the subsequentt alksb y the regime delegation'sr efusalo fa ny negotiations over the president'sfuture. 26 However, if the prospectso f inclusiven egotiations and constructive engagementi nG eneva -l et aloneo f anys ignificant breakthrough -r emain slim, the territoriala nd partial political consolidation among non-regime movements offersp ossibilities fora n eventual transition. Kurdish political and military success againstD aesh has buttressed de factol egitimacy as thea uthority in mucho fn ortheastern Syria, although this positionr emains somewhatt enuous, both in cities of dividedc ontrol, such as Qamishli, and in relation to the rebels over attempts to join the Kurdish-dominated northwestern and northeastern cantons. The opposition rebel movement-having withstood bombing by both the regime and Russia, increased interventiono n the groundbyIran, Hizbullah and other foreign fighters,p rotracted sieges, and attacksb yt he YPG and Daesh -c an consequently claim ap olitical spacew hichi su nlikely to disappear. This is mosto bviously the case in Idlib province,b ut will requiree xternally facilitated locala greements in stillcontesteds pacesi nt he divided city of Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs.
The keyp ointh erei sa bout the existence of relatively consolidatedlocal spaces,o ccupied by political actorsthat arep otential partners fort he West and its regional partners, nowa nd in an eventual post-civil wart ransition. Such potentialpartners areneeded regardless of whetherS yria's currentd ef acto partition is overcome in the contexto f an ational solution or becomesm ore permanent in the longer term. The emergence of these spaces and actors presents an opportunity forengagement and fors trengtheninga nd supporting local initiatives thatc an critically shape the naturea nd direction of af uture transition. The differentoptions available to the West and its partnersi nt his contexta re the focus of the following sections.
Post-Civil War Governance Arrangements in Syria: What to Expect and How to Prepare
Based on thisa rticle'sa nalysis so far, it is possible to makes ome reasonable assumptions about differento ptions and about the process and substance of ap ost-civilw ar transition in Syria. Once these areestablished, it is also possible to identify the keyriskssuch options entail andtoconsider actions to mitigatethose risks, laying the foundations of acredible and sustainable transition. To do this, this section first summarisesthe current stateofaffairsinS yria (as of May2016) and then, based on moreg eneralised findings from existing research on civil wars ettlements, extrapolateap ossible trajectoryf or Syria.S pecial attentioni s given to the opportunities thatthe West and its regional partnersn ow have to work with thosenon-regime forces which arep olitically,m ilitarily and territorially moreconsolidated.
The startingpointofthe discussion, therefore,i st hatt he contraction of the Assad regime seems to have been halted and its imminent defeat is unlikely.T he regime has recovereda nd is nowl ikely to co-existwith adiverse and sometimes opportunistic alliance of rebel groups, with differing ethnic, religiousa nd political bases. Some arel ocal entities, othersare regional or national, backed by various externalpatrons whose agendas on Syria (andb eyond) are, individually, not alwaysc oherent and, collectively, virtually incompatible.T hose groups converge in three areas: the rejection of Assad and the senior political and military leadership of his regime; the rejection of Daeshand JabhatAl-Nusraaslegitimate players in af uturet ransition; and the preservation of Syria'sterritorial integrity, rather than an egotiatedb reak-up of the countryi nto twoo rm ores uccessor areas.
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In the currente nvironment, characterised by ap atchwork of slowly stabilising local battlefields across different frontlines (the regime and those loyalt oi tv ersust he rebel opposition bloc; the regimea nd those loyalt o it versus Daesh; the rebel opposition bloc versus Daesh; and the intra-rebel opposition bloc), it is unlikely thata ny of the factions willhavesuch resounding militaryd ominanceo nt he battlefield thati tw ill be able to imposei ts will on othersc oncerning futureg overnance arrangements in Syria.N or is it likely thata ny would be able to sustain such an imposition beyond the shortt erm. As ac onsequence,o ne should expect some form of as ettlementn egotiated primarily among the main rebel factions and their keye xternalb ackers. Such a settlementw ill need to take accounto f fivedimensions;and the extent to which these willb er eflectedi nab alanced wayi nt he terms of thes ettlement will determine itss ustainability. They include: the ethnic, religious/sectarian, local and political divisions in Syria that have beenhardeningoverthe course of the civil warsince 2011;the 'un-mixing' of formerlyd iverse local communities, and the consequentfl owso fi nternally displaced persons andr efugees; the intense hatred and desirefor revenge, as well as the deep distrust, betweena nd within communities in Syria,r esulting from thesufferingendured during more than fiveyearsofcivil warinwhich more than 400,000p eople have beenk illed, morethan 11 million displaced and more than 4.8 million have become refugees in neighbouring countries;the economic and humanitarian devastation of the country; and the regional,c ross-border, and transnational ethnic, religiousa nd sectarian alliances in which the Syrian civil warisembedded.
Given both the complexity of the constellation of actors in the Syriancivil wara nd of the issuesa ts take,e xisting research on civil wars ettlements 27 suggeststhatthe mostlikely settlement will have three main characteristics. First, it will be rigid, withap redetermined compositiono fk ey transitional governance institutions and at erritorial re-organisation of the stater eflecting both the balance of powerand the extent of spatial controlb yd ifferent factions in the winning alliance at the time of a ceasefireo rs ettlement. Second, it will be hybrid, reflecting pre-existing local, political, territorial andd emographic realities on the ground. Third,i tw ill be ambiguous, leaving significant room forc ompeting and conflicting interpretations of settlementp rovisions andimplementation procedures.
In other words, aviable negotiated agreementi sl ikely to combine weak power-sharing arrangementsa tt he centre with am ultipolar and hybrid territorial systemo fs elf-governance that willusher in at enseand contested transition period,w ith the aim of achieving am orep ermanents et of arrangements. 28 In lighto fr ecente xperienceso f post-civilw ar transitions, it is possible to envisage four 'models'o rp athways. The first is the (pre-2015)Y emen model:ap arallel (pre-)transition period characterised by at ransitional governmento fn ational unity alongside an ational dialogue,f ollowedb ya constitutional drafting process, all overseen andf acilitatedb yt he UN. 29 The second is the Bosnia model: a UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation overseeing thei mplementation of ac onstitution agreeda sp art of a comprehensive peace agreement. 30 The third is the Iraq model: the drafting and implementation of ac onstitution under militaryo ccupation. 31 The fourthi st he Libya model: ar apidly disintegrating, domestically led process of post-conflict state-building. 32 Of these four models, the Libya model is clearlyu ndesirable,w hile the Iraq and Bosnia models are, to different degrees, unlikely as there is at this stagen or ealistice xpectation of the necessary militaryf ootprinti nS yria that would accompanye ithero ft hese models. This leaves, realistically,o nly a version of the Yemen model. While the transition process in Yemen is farf rom completeand does not, at the moment, advertise itself as ar esounding success of either international or regional crisis management, it offers an umbero f important insightsi nto howt op repare fora ne ventual post-civilw ar transition in Syria,p rovidingo bservers with the opportunity to identifya nd potentially mitigatet he likely riskst hatw ill be encountered.
The first questiontoask is whatcan potentiallyg ow rong in the negotiation and implementation of ap olitical settlement. The Yemen model -a s well as otherr ecente xperiencesf rom the Arab uprisings of 2011 (including, in particular,E gypta nd Libya), from Sudan'sC omprehensiveP eace Agreementa nd the subsequentc ivil warinpost-independence South Sudan, from Afghanistana nd Iraq, and from earlierc onflict and crisis management experiences in the Western Balkans and the former SovietU nion -s uggests thatt herea re an umbero fk ey risks. These include: prolonged and eventually inconclusivepeace negotiationsafteran initial, but potentially volatile,c easefire has beene stablished; ap artial and not fully inclusive agreement, in which either crucial aspects of post-civilw ar governance arrangements aren ot coveredinsufficient detail or aresimply left forl ater negotiations; ap artial agreementf romw hich keyp layers are excluded or subsequently walk away; ap rotracted transition period in which the implementation process stalls; or transitional arrangementsw hich eventually becomepermanent.
All these risksb ringw ith them the potentialo fd efectionsf rom an agreement and the consequent possibility of renewedcivil war, instigated by domestic or externalactors( possibly through the creation of newp roxy forces or through mored irectf ormso f intervention), or by ac ombination of both.
Acknowledging these risksi sa n important first stept owards early and effectivem itigating action. While there is no guaranteed recipet hat canc onclusively and comprehensively mitigateall of them, there areanumber of steps thatc an, and should, be taken nowb yt he international community to avoid the nightmare scenario of another Libya and to avoid repeating the mistakesm ade in Yemen. Threes etso f considerations should shapethe thinking of the international community in preparingf or acredible and sustainable post-civilwar transition in Syria.
The first of these is to recognise, and act upon,t he needf or flexible, inclusivea nd expanding negotiation formats. This relatest ob oth the participants and the issues. In terms of participants, nowi st he time to individuallya nd collectively reach out to,a nd work with,a sm anyp layers in the insurgency as possible at all levels. Thiss hould involve, at am inimum, discussions withw illing partieso na formal or informal pre-negotiation agreementt hatw ould outline the principles of and an agenda for subsequentnegotiations. As this process evolves,moreparties canbebroughtin, creatingab roader and morei nclusive basis of futures ettlementn egotiations andw idening the consensus on its key principles and agenda items.
In parallel, the West and its regional partnersn ow also have a bettero pportunity to build capacity within the opposition rebel bloc, which in turncan also help to overcome initial reluctancea nd persuade individual players to engagew ith am ore established negotiation format. At the same time, such aprocess cansensitise international mediators and facilitators to the degree to which specific issues areparticularly contested. It canfurther help them to shape an agenda forfuture negotiations thati ss equenced in such away thatabreakdown of negotiations canbeavoidedand allowthem to draw up contingency plans if negotiations stall over certain issues. It is alsoconceivable to imagine thatNGOs currently engaged in humanitarian reliefe ffortsc ould playas ignificantr ole in this process, especially as fara sc apacity-building at the local levelisc oncerned. This needs to happen in such away thatitdoes not jeopardise their primaryrole, providing humanitarian relief; thatitr esponds to local demand, instead of being driven solelyb yi nternational conceptions of assistance; thati tc ontributes to the involvemento fc ivil society actors and organisations and prevents the monopolisation of thep rocess by militarya nd political elites; and thati t enables alevel of co-ordination with the international community thatd oes not run countertothe long-termf easibility and viability of apolitical settlement.
The second seto fc onsiderations derives from the localisednatureofthe anti-Assad coalition and of non-regime forces morew idely.I tc oncerns the needt oi ntegratet op-down and bottom-up approaches in managing the transition process. On the one hand,any potentially sustainable settlementw ill needt or eflectt he military, political, economic and demographic realities in and beyond Syria.O nt he otherh and, international efforts needt oc onsider, shape and leverage local deals being made now, includinga ssessing the impact of emerging local arrangements on the feasibility of futurenational-level structures. These effortsneed to shape such deals wherever possible so that viables tate structures cans till emerge in ab roader political settlement, and also so thattheyleveragethe possibility and reality of local deals as building blocks fors uch as ettlement. In all of this,i tw ill be essential to factor in the currentl evel of displacemento f people within and beyond Syria,a nd the possibility and sustainabilityo f theirr eturn and resettlement. Even if thec urrentd ef actop artition of Syria cannot be overcome in the long term, addressingd isplacementw ould contributet os tability and security within and between eachofthe entities andthus reduce the likelihood of alater resurgence in violence.C ritical to this would be the managementofstill-highly contestedspaceslikethe divided city of Aleppo or the suburbs of Damascus.
The thirda nd final seto f considerationsc oncerns the sustainabilityo ft he transition process as am eanso fb oth establishing and preserving peace and stability within and beyond Syria ando f( re)building the social, political and economic foundations of av iable statei na situation in which local capacityt o do so is in shorts upply,t rusta cross communities is very low, and divisions aredeep and entrenched. Consequently, careful consideration needs to be given to the use of settlementg uarantees at different levels (local, national, regional, global)a nd across different sectors (political, economic, military). Such guarantees should be tied to incentives fort he various Syrianp arties (and their externalb ackersa sa ppropriate) so thatt heyl imit the extent and impact of potential defections from the agreement. Equally importantly, nowisthe time to thinkabout howthe implementation of anyfutureagreement canb es equenced such that all parties will remain committedtoit.
Beyond Governance Arrangements: Addressing the Conflict's Legacy
One of the keydestabilising factorsduring and after anyp ost-civilw ar transition period is the impact of the conflict's legacyonefforts to rebuild viable states ands ocieties. 33 Transitional justice programming is meantt oa ddresss uch issues, but it is in itself ahighly contested area of academic and policy debate. Moreover, it is one thatintersectsclosely with state-buildinge fforts inasmuch as rules of thep ost-warp olitical game arel ikely to determine whati sp ossible in terms of transitionalj ustice and vice versa. Those who negotiate peace and futureg overnancea rrangements are likely to be guidedasmuch by their own personal interestsa sb yt hose of the communities theyc laim to represent; and areunlikely to volunteer forcustodial sentencesorfor exclusion from positions of influenceb ecause of crimes and atrocities theycommitted.
Though little canm eaningfullyb e plannedt oa ddressa trocities and the conflict's legacyu ntil the conditions form oving forwarda re understood, three main points stand out. First,i f at ransitional justice strategy is nott o become isolateda nd meaningless, it will needt ob ee mbedded in existing networks, able to utilise them and current actors. Thism eans confronting morally complex terrain. Second, theS yrian transitionmay well forcethe underlying assumptions and implementation mechanisms of transitional justice to be rethought; thati s, the transition process mayh avet he potential to 'reshape' transitionalj ustice.T hird, and related, transitionalj ustice cannot be disengaged from local processes. Donors and international advisersmustplan their strategies,a nd learn from paste rrors. The Syrian conflict has not leftcompletely clear linesb etween insurgentg roups, lucas, YakInThOu anD WOlFF non-militant organisations and civil society actors. Withthe militarisation of the conflict,a ctorst hath avea risen out of insurgencygroupshaveofteneclipsed thosew ho have emergedf romc ivil society,and in some cases theyhavebeen connectedw ith one another. Because manyactivists have been killed, detained or forced to flee Syria, the initialforce for reconstruction in 'liberated' areas is the leadership of rebel units. Ad ecimated civils ociety also provokes questions about whatcapacity it mayhavetobuild or deepen local democratics tructures. Rebuilding civil society structures and addressing thed eep divisionsw ithin communities willtakesome time.
The experienceo fA hrar Al-Sham, the largest faction in the rebellion, providesa ni nterestingi llustration of the issuest hata ny transitionalj ustice process will have to address. Making savvy use of socialmedia, public relations and outreach strategies,A hrar Al-Sham has rebrandedi tself, 34 moving from an organisation with linkstoJabhatAl-Nusra to amainstream Syrian opposition group thatcalls for'anational unifying project' -one that, in the wordsofits international spokesman Labib Al-Nahhas, 'should not be bound to as ingle ideology'. It has broad internaln etworksa cross the spectrumofactorsaswell as good access to internationalm edia. Its 2015 articles in the Washington Post and the Daily Telegraph have demonstrated this new hybrid and its power. 35 Looking ahead, it is possible that actorsl ikeA hrar Al-Sham, and other groups( or their offshoots) thatb ecome increasingly' moderate' as they are gradually incorporated into ap eace process,w ill form thef oundations of transitional justice work. They will certainly have an opiniono ni ta nd theyw ill have access to media thatw ill enable themt oc ommunicatet hose opinions. With these dynamics, aprimary challengew ill be ensuring thatt he process does not becomeawhitewashing of pastc rimes, norapublic relations tool forg roupsw ith one leg in militant campsa nd anotheri np eace-building processes. Civils ociety organisations and humanitarian actorswith pre-existing networkso nt he ground arel ikely to be keya llies in anyt ransitionalj ustice process. Groupss uch as the Syrian Justice andA ccountability Centre, the Local Coordination Committees, the Violations Documentation Center, the Foundation to RestoreE quality and Education in Syria,t he SyrianN etwork forHuman Rights, together with lawyers anda ctivists, amongsto thers, have beeni nvolved in some of the most sophisticated, innovativea nd strategic documentation effortst hath avee ver existedd uring ac onflict. An umber of human rightsa ctorsh avec onducted steady and consistentw ork collecting, documenting and mapping evidence of humanr ights violations.T he resulting repositoryofdataisnot only being used to track the scale of human and material loss, buti sl ikely to form theb ackbone of any(unlikely)prosecutions and (more likely) reparations and reform processes. These organisations arel ikely to be ready to begin their work 'day one' after as ettlement. In otherw ords, the most relevant work regarding accountability forc onflict-relateda trocities in Syria will probably come from activists within localc ommunities and from leading social media campaigns. Local councils operating in non-Assad parts of Syria,s upported by an etwork of civil societyo rganisations, area lready dealing withi ssues of criminal justice and the radicalisation of local youth with micro-empowermentp rogrammes and vocational training. These arel ikely to be the voices thats hape practical thinking aboutdealingwith the legacies of conflict-relatedviolence.
Yetanimportantcaveatalso applies here: civil society actorsh avel argely been marked by the same divisions as the rest of the conflict partiesa nd arel ikely to be involved in the same internecine conflicts, an involvement thatw ill probably become increasingly apparenta sd iscussions around transitional justiceb egini ne arnest. As regional and internationalorganisations, foreign governments andtheir associated donor and development agencies start to thinkabout post-civilw ar optionsf or transitional justice,t heys hould bear in mind an umber of broaderl essons to be learntf romo ther experiences of dealing with the legacy of conflict-related violence.
First, it will be importantt ot hink from the outsetabout ameaningfulrole forcivil society in anytransitional justice processes. Donor states should support the inclusion of civil society organisations at the initial planning stage. Moreover, human rightso rganisationss hould keep pressureo nd onorst or emember thatc ivil society organisations arek ey vectorsfor the construction of networks, social trusta nd, ultimately,s ocial cohesion. The corollaryo ft his is that adequate fundings hould be allocated from theo utsetf or civil society actors. Past experiences indicatet hatv eryf ew resources were allocatedt os uch actors during transitionaljustice programming, as hortcomingw hich both significantly inhibits their ability to fostermeaningful changea nd also hinderst he objectives of transitionalj ustice programming. 36 The inclusion of civil society perspectives in initiald ecision-makingp rocesses often improvesl ong-termc ollaboration betweencivil society and the state, and cana ssisti nt he establishment of civil societyactorsaslegitimatepartners with (or counterweights to)the state.Itwill be importanttoallowtime forcivil society to rebuild its internal relationships. It is also importantnot to rushthatprocess forthe sakeofkeeping to an externallyimposed timeframe or roadmap. 37 Following from this,d onorsw ill need to think very carefully about funding ratios among differentt ransitional justice initiatives.T he allocation of funding is notoriously lopsided and this has damagedh olistic approachest o transitionaljustice in the past. Including civil society actorsi nt he process of donor and governmentprioritisation and strategy-setting from the beginningc an ensuret hatt he needs of stakeholders and relevant communities arer eflected in nationalpolicies.
Equally,asdiscussions move towards truth-telling and truth-seeking,t he process needs to be genuinely inclusive, and not rushed by externala ctorsa nd timelines. The processes of truth-seeking areofteninherently as important as -or sometimes morei mportantt han -a ny final report.T hisi sp articularly so when divisionsare as deep as those in Syria.
Donors also need to develop a transitional justice strategy,r ather sYRIa: laYIng ThE FOunDaTIOns FOR a cREDIBlE anD susTaInaBlE TRansITIOn RUSI JOURNAL JUNE/JULY2016 than funding discretea nd unconnected projects.T he strongeste ngagements with transitionalj ustice processes have beent hose thatf oresaw al ongterm commitmenta nd responded appropriately to evolving needs. However, this approach needs vision, planning,s ustainede ngagement and commitment, as well as flexibility. Finally, justa st he conflict has lastedm uch longer than manyp eople predicted, so recovery wills imilarly take moreti me than expected. Dealing with the conflict's legacyw ill be am ultigenerational exercise. It will take time, it will suffer political setbacks, and it will requirea n awareness thatt herew ill be highs and lows.L ong-term commitmentw ill be necessary to overcome cycles of conflict and atrocity. 38 
Conclusion
With the partition of Syria nowareality, and likely to remain so fora tl eastt he foreseeable future, ac learers trategy is needed to facilitateag radual transition to ap ost-civilw ar order in which Assad and his inner circle mayo rm ay not have ap ermanentp lace. The space in the northwest of the country-a nd potentially the south, depending on militarya nd political developmentsneeds to be consolidateda nd further legitimised. This needs to happenlocally throughthe further developmentoflocal governance structures, includingp ublic service and judicials ystems. Nationally, it requires the continuation of the negotiation process within and among the differentf actions in the civil war. Regionally and globally,e fforts need to continue to protectn on-regime spaces, to push back Daesh and JabhatAl-Nusra, and to work towardsap ermanenta nd stable ceasefireb etween them that can be partofapost-civilwar transition.
In those areas controlled by the opposition rebel bloc and the Kurdish forces, the West and its regional partners needt os upport nascentl ocal effortst o meett he immediate challenges. These include the provision of food, shelter and basic goods forb oth residents and the manydisplaced Syrians in the region; the creation of inclusive governance institutions; and the establishmento fa legal systemthatfollows due process and recognises legal rights.
Internationals upport for functioning governance needs to be seen as the beginning of along process leading towardsad e-escalation and resolution of the Syrianc risis,r ather than as its endpoint. Pursued carefully, it cancontributeto: establishing working relationships betweent he West,i ts regional partnersa nd groupst hath ave consolidatedt heir presencei nS yrian communities; consolidating am inimal politicalc onsensus among factions participating in the High Negotiations Committee; developing amorerealistic and coherenta pproach to the Syrian crisist hati sb roadly shared by the West and its regional allies and thus renewing relations betweent hose allies,i ncluding France,T urkey and the Gulf States, allofwhom have expressed frustration withi ndecision inherentt o and incoherence of US and British policy; offering an alternativetothe long-term prospecto faprotracted civil wara nd the consolidation and possible further expansion of territorial controlbyDaesh; and starting aprocess to assistindealing with the ever-worsening humanitarian crisis. This is by no means an optimal solution to the Syrianconflict, but there is no 'optimal solution' in the current situation becauset herei sn os ingle country, no single externalc oalition, no single strategy and no singleanti-regime force. Ther ebelsare consolidating their de factostate in the northwest.With the backingo fR ussia, Iran and Hizbullah, the Assad (or otherA lawite-dominated successor) regime is almostc ertain to hold onto its heartland from the Mediterraneana nd Lebaneseb orders through Homs to Damascus. Fort heir part, the Kurdsa re unlikely to giveu p their territorial gains or their vision of a federal Syria as amodel forthe future.
The political, legal and social development of opposition and Kurdishheld areas protectedb yav iable and externallyg uaranteed ceasefirei s thereforethe mostproductiveapproach. It provides forlegitimacy andresponsibility, whilea lso addressing thosei ssues that fedt he uprising as well as encouraging groupswith disparate viewpoints to seek progress through dialogue rather than confrontation. The establishmento f governance andt he provision of justice not only provides acountertothe Assad regime. It also confirms thee xistence of alternatives to Daesh. Eventually,i t allows groups to be distinguished from factionss uch as JabhatA l-Nusra.F inally, if Assad should happent of all quickly,a s Muammar Qadhafidid in Libya,orslowly and inconclusively,a sA li Abdullah Saleh did in Yemen, then the provision of that alternativec ould mitigates ome of the violenceand political instability thathave marred the aftermathso fo ther 'Arab Spring'revolutions.  
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